Capitalism, understood as a world-ecology that joins accumulation, power, and nature in dialectical unity, has been adept at evading so-called Malthusian dynamics through an astonishing historical capacity to produce, locate, and occupy cheap natures external to the system. In recent decades, the last frontiers have closed, and this astonishing historical capacity has withered. This "withering" is perhaps most evident in capitalism's failure to offer a new, actually productive, agricultural model-as agrobiotechnology failed to deliver on its promissory notes. Moving from bad to worse, a second set of contradictions is now mediated through climate change. Climate change, one among many ongoing biospheric shifts, is interwoven with the totality of neoliberal agriculture's contradictions to produce a new contradiction: negative value. This signals the emergence of forms of nature that are increasingly hostile to capital accumulation and that can be temporarily fixed (if at all) only through increasingly costly, toxic, and dangerous strategies. The rise of negative value-whose accumulation has been latent for much of capitalist history-therefore suggests a significant and rapid erosion of opportunities for the appropriation of new streams of unpaid work/energy. As such, these new limits are qualitatively different from the nutrient and resource depletion of earlier, developmental crises of the longue dure´e Cheap Food model. These contradictions, within capital, arising from negative value, are today encouraging an unprecedented shift toward a radical ontological politics, within Special thanks to William H. Sewell Jr. and four anonymous reviewers, and to
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10. Moore, "Ecology"; Jason W. Moore, "Madeira, Sugar, and the Conquest of Nature in the 'First' Sixteenth Century, Part I," Review 32, no. 4 (2009) : 345-90, and "Madeira, Sugar, and the Conquest of Nature in the 'First' Sixteenth Century, Part II," Review 33, no. 1 (2010): 1-24. 11 . Raj Patel, "The Long Green Revolution," Journal of Peasant Studies 40, no. 1 (2013): 1-63. 12. There is of course more than one capitalist temporality. Time, as with space, is multilayered. In the capitalist era, however, the law of value (understood through the formation of socially necessary labor time) exerts a determining influence. The classic account of time and capital, beyond Marx's work, is Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, These contradictions pivot on climate change but are not reducible to it. Rather than catalog the impacts of climate change alongside those of longer-run contradictions, my intention is to show how climate change entwines with the totality of neoliberal agriculture's contradictions to produce a new set of challenges: negative value. In this reading, climate (and the rest of nature) does not exist as an external barrier but rather is coconstitutive of a new set of contradictions. Negative value refers to the ferocious combination of rising costs of production (an old cumulative dynamic) with the novel global conjoncture of planetary instability and unpredictability expressed by climate change. The paired, but spatially and temporally uneven, processes of extracting nature's "free gifts" (including human work) and toxifying the biosphere (including humans) have now reached a breaking point. The accumulation of negative value, immanent but latent from the origins of capitalism, is now issuing a layer of contradictions that can no longer 1993); see also William H. Sewell Jr., "Temporalities of Capitalism," Socio-Economic Review 6 (2008): 517-37.
13. The phrase "work/energy" originates with Caffentzis in a groundbreaking 1980 essay on the interconnected crises of energy, labor power, and social reproduction in the 1970s. See George Caffentzis, "The Work/Energy Crisis and the Apocalypse," in Letters of Blood and Fire: Work, Machines, and the Crisis of Capitalism (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2013), 11-57. 14. Jason W. Moore Review 32, no. 1 (2009): 113-46. be "fixed" by technical, organizational, or imperial restructuring. Put simply, the ongoing closure of frontiers limits the capacity of capital and states to accomplish two necessary goals: (1) attenuate the rising costs of production; and (2) remove the geometrically rising volume of waste from the global determination of profitability. If capitalism is an "economy of unpaid costs," 17 the bills are coming due. And if only that were the crux of the problem! For capitalism is also a system of unpaid work.
But how do we conceptualize relation of paid and unpaid work? In what follows, I understand capital accumulation to work through two entwined but distinct movements: accumulation by capitalization and accumulation by appropriation. I take paid work (capitalization) to be the domain of the capital-labor conflict over shares of value. This is the question of exploitation. I take unpaid work to be a struggle over the forms and relations of capital to unmonetized social reproduction (e.g., "domestic labor) and to the "work of nature." 18 This is the question of appropriation. In this, wage work emerges as the zone of exploitation: accumulation by capitalization. But capitalization depends on an even greater movement: the appropriation of the unpaid work of human and extrahuman natures. This is accumulation by appropriation.
My use of "appropriation" therefore differs from that of Marx, who deployed the term more or less interchangeably with the exploitation of wage labor. Accumulation by appropriation names those extraeconomic processes that identify, secure, and channel unpaid work outside the commodity system into the circuit of capital. Scientific, cartographic, and botanical revolutions, broadly conceived, are good examples. Movements of appropriation, in this sense, are distinct from movements of the exploitation of wage labor. So important is the appropriation of unpaid work that the rising rate of exploitation depends upon the fruits of appropriation derived from Cheap Natures, understood primarily as the "Four Cheaps": labor power, food, energy, and raw materials. 17. K. William Kapp, The Social Costs Of Private Enterprise (New York: Schocken, 1950), 231. 18. This relation between capital and the mobilization of unpaid work is, of course, mediated by the state. I have imprudently, but necessarily, abstracted this moment from present argument. The elements of a socioecological synthesis of state, capital, and unpaid work can be found in James O'Connor, Natural Causes: Essays in Ecological Socialism (New York: Guilford, 1998) ; and James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). Christian Parenti's groundbreaking work on the "environment making state" may be read as a companion to the present argument; see "The Environment Making State: Territory, Nature, and Value," Antipode, published electronically 2014, doi: 10.1111/anti.12134. Today, this relation-of capitalization and appropriation-faces new challenges.
It is not simply that there are no more great frontiers. There are indeed fewer opportunities to appropriate the free gifts of human and extrahuman nature.
But there is a new contradiction in play: the rise of negative value. The present conjuncture combines depletion, class struggle, and the unprecedented biospheric unpredictability issuing from capital's transgression of "planetary boundaries." 19 It is a potent cocktail. Together, they shape a dynamic of an impending and catastrophic shift for capital: a radical increase in the costs of production. This is the hallmark of an ongoing transition from "surplus" to "negative" value. The signs of this transition are, as I will show, all around us. My thesis is simple: the core processes of capital accumulation are now generating increasingly direct and immediate barriers to the expanded reproduction of capital. These contradictions within capital, arising from negative value, are today encouraging an unprecedented shift toward movements against capital. These are crystallized around a new radical "ontological" challenge-food sovereignty above all-that destabilizes crucial points of agreement in the modern world system: What is food? What is nature? What is valuable?
CHEAP FOOD IN THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECOLOGY
Cheap food is "cheap" in a specific sense: more calories produced with less average labor time in the commodity system. In this context, "more calories" and "less labor time" refer to the long-run trend: more and more calories, less and less socially necessary labor time. Capitalist agriculture not only increased productivity and reduced the wage bill; it also made possible the dynamic pairing of proletarianization and rising labor productivity: not only by setting "free" peasants and others once tied to the land, but also by reducing the cost (value composition) of labor power, which facilitates a rising rate of exploitation even in the absence of significant technical advance.
There have certainly been noncapitalist modes of cultivation that have enjoyed very high levels of food production with very modest effort. Where an average "worker-hour" in English agriculture around 1800 yielded about 2,600 calories, premised on milk and wheat, the average "worker-hour" in swidden agriculture in early nineteenth-century Brazil, cultivating manioc, maize, and sweet potatoes, yielded between 7,000 and 17,600 calories. 20 Historical Capitalism (London: Verso, 1983) ; and Nancy Fraser, "Behind Marx's Hidden Abode," New Left Review II/86 (2014): 55-72. Efforts to expand the reserve of army of labor may indeed suppress wages for the working class, but a critical margin of survival is provided by a double relation to food: the cheapening of food's value composition through productivity advance (cheap food), and access to food by nonmarket means. Even in the United States, working-class families through the first half of the twentieth century often cultivated small vegetable gardens. About half of all such families in a midsized industrial town such as Muncie, Indiana, did so in the 1920s; during the 1930s, the working-class Los Angeles suburb of South Gate turned toward community gardening as key to surviving the Depression. See, respectively, Linda Gordon, "US Women's History," in The New American History, ed. Eric Foner (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 271; and Becky M. Nicolaides, My Blue Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working-Class Suburbs of Los Angeles, 1920 -1965 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002 , 171-72. Although such moves toward decommodification have been occurring in recent years, a crucial difference in Global North today is the erosion consequent of practical knowledge, in relation not only to cultivation but also to food preparation (Paul Robert Gilbert, "Deskilling, Agrodiversity, and the Seed Trade," Agriculture and Human Values 30, no. 1 [2013]: 101-14; Clare Pettinger, Michelle Holdsworth, and Mariette Gerber, "Meal Patterns and Cooking Practices in Southern France and Central England," Public Health Nutrition 9, no. 8 [2006] : 1020-26; Phil Lyon, Anne Colquhoun, and Emily Alexander, "Deskilling the Domestic Kitchen: National Tragedy or the Making of a Modern Myth?," Food Service Technology 3, no. 3-4 [2003] : 167-75). These are important strategies for surviving an era of wage repression and rising food costs. Perhaps most significantly, the contraction of nonmarkets means of food acquisition makes even small shifts in food price index profound for households on the edge of food in/security. This makes high food prices in 2014 significantly different from the era of high food commodity prices in the period before World War I. endless accumulation of capital, the pursuit of power, and the coproduction of nature form an organic whole. 23 In this analysis-our second register-capitalism becomes a set of relations through which work/energy is transformed into value, understood as socially necessary labor time (abstract social labor). "Work/energy" (or potential work/energy) may be capitalized-as in commodified labor power via the cash nexus-or it may be appropriated via noneconomic means, as in work of a river, waterfall, forest, or social reproduction. 24 I take as a point of departure White's apt conceptualization of energy as the capacity to do work. Work, in turn, is the product of a force acting on a body and the distance the body is moved in the direction of that force. Push a large rock and you are expending energy and doing work; the amount of each depends on how large the rock and how far you push it.
The weight and flow of water produce the energy that allows rivers to do the work of moving rock and soil: the greater the volume of water in the river and the steeper the gradient of its bed, the greater its potential energy. 25 White's sketch is focused on the geophysical work/energy implied in the historical geography of a river (the Columbia, in this instance 29. Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure"; Robert C. Allen, "Tracking the Agricultural Revolution in England," Economic History Review 52, no. 2 (1999): 209-35. and cheap labor power. Just 39 percent of the English workforce was in agriculture by 1700. 30 The half century after 1750 was marked by the failure of English agriculture to sustain its surging productivity of the previous century. 31 As early as the 1740s, English agriculture "did not increase supplies of food and raw materials to match the rapidly growing demands of the urban industrial economy." 32 Agricultural productivity growth slowed dramatically after 1760, and food prices began to increase. 33 Even with sharply rising imports from Ireland, 34 English food prices increased twice as fast as the industrial price index at the end of the eighteenth century. 35 Relative to textiles and coal, food prices increased by 66 and 48 percent, respectively, between 1770 and 1795. 36 Nor was this a narrowly English phenomenon. Productivity faltered, inequality widened, and food prices increased throughout the Atlantic world. Output per worker was either falling or stagnant across western Europe in the half century after 1750. 37 In France, food prices, mainly bread, shot up 65 percent-three times faster than wages-in the two decades before 1789. 38 In central Mexico, too, yields faltered and prices rose-maize, by nearly 50 percent-in the later eighteenth century. 39 Abel dates the onset of the downturn from the 1730s, inaugurating eighty years of rising food prices, accelerating sharply around 1770.
Across Europe, between 1730 and 1810, the price of the "chief bread grains" 39. Sonya Lipsett-Rivera, "Puebla's Eighteenth-Century Agrarian Decline," Hispanic American Historical Review 70, no. 3 (1990) ; we should take care not to collapse two processes here: the "specific device of the Enclosure Act" and the "general phenomenon of agricultural concentration," Eric J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day (New York: Penguin, 1968), 101. 44. Calculated from Broadberry, Campbell, and van Leeuwen, "When Did Britain Industrialise?," 23. therefore not only biophysical and "economic," but, also and at the same time, pivotal moments of the world class struggle. Long inflationary swings have been, in the long history of capitalism, moments through which the bourgeoisie deploys the power of the market-backed by the power of the state, as during the great wave of parliamentary enclosures after 1760-to redistribute value from the producers to the accumulators of surplus value. 45 Income inequality, a rough proxy and effective if temporary "fix" for capital accumulation, rose sharply: the English bourgeoisie-the top 5 percent-"gained enormously at the expense of the middle and upper-middle classes" over the next century. Meanwhile, the poverty ("pauperisation") rate grew by more than 50 percent after 1759, encompassing a fifth of the population by 1801. 46 This was not the first time such a redistribution of value had occurred; the "price revolution" after 1500 also redistributed value from workers to capitalists, issuing in part from the forcible suppression of peasant and proletarian diets. 47 Indeed, English per capita food consumption declined across the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (and not only for the English): a crucial subsidy to world accumulation. 48 In the conjoncture of accelerating dispossession and proletarianization combined with stagnating productivity, there were two possibilities. One was that rising food prices would drive up the wage bill for capital, enacting a kind of wage squeeze on accumulation. The other was the road of forced underconsumption, whereby working-class food budgets were instead squeezed. This probably resulted in a net caloric and certainly nutritional decline for proletarian diets-at least in England but probably well beyond. 49 The proposition finds support in declining physical 45. Michael Turner, Enclosures in Britain, 1750 -1830 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1984 . For Allen, the parliamentary enclosures of the late eighteenth century may be understood as a political process aimed at effecting "a massive redistribution of income from farmers to landowners" (Robert C. Allen, "The Efficiency and Distributional Consequences of Eighteenth Century Enclosures," Economic Journal 92 [1982] : 937). Nitzan and Bichler make the theoretical point: "inflation is a conflictual process of redistribution . . . [T]he inflationary struggle isn't simply a tug-of-war between 'independent' individuals or groups in society. It is an entire regime, an encompassing political process of transforming capitalist power; see 48. Allen, "Tracking," 216-17. 49. O'Brien, "Home Market"; Allen, "Tracking." stature in the half century after 1760. 50 What bears emphasizing is that the redistribution of value through food price movements is a middle-run strategy.
Consumption can only be driven down so far. At some point, the world-ecological surplus-the mass of unpaid work/energy relative to the mass of accumulated capital-must be expanded and not simply maintained. New frontiers must be opened, their "free gifts" identified and mapped, secured, and appropriated.
How was cheap food restored after 1815? In a word, America.
NORTH AMERICA: THE TWO REVOLUTIONS
OF INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE
The crucial difference between the early nineteenth and early twenty-first centuries is this. In the "long" nineteenth century (ca. 1763-1914) , cheap food could be reestablished. Today it cannot. The nineteenth century restoration of cheap food occurred through a combination of "productivity and plunder": new technical innovations, such as the steamship, railroads, and mechanization, combined with an extraordinary frontier movement in North America. 51 The breadbasket of capitalism would migrate, from Europe to the United States. This was an extraordinary development in human history; no civilization had relocated its agricultural heartland from one continent to another. This transition would be the work of the "first" nineteenth century (ca. 1763-1830s).
It was an era of profound chaos and restructuring during which a new configuration of town and country emerged, "dripping with blood and dirt" (as Marx would say). Peasants across the Atlantic world revolted against movements "from above" aimed at deepening capital's hegemony over the global countryside, ranging from Pugachev's revolt in Russia to a series of "backcountry" rebellions in North America. 52 Nowhere was this more significant than in the nascent United States, whose modern political form takes shape through the animals, materials to construct and enclose farms, all came from outside the farm and even the region. Cash was therefore scarcer and more pressing than natural fertility. Transplanted exotic humans were compelled from the beginning to grow and sell as much as possible. Mining the nutrients accumulated by nature over thousands of years, settler farmers, cowboys and ranchers could sell the products of transplanted species back to the Old World at cut-rate prices. However, soil that is not renewed is depleted. Settlers were more deeply embedded in markets than in the earthly cycles of the Great Plains. 54
These earthly cycles were, however, not abolished but joined in a new synthesis.
The history of agriculture is a coproductive, world-ecological affair: a history of how humans make the rest of nature, and of how nature as a whole makes human organization. That such coproduction is regularly forgotten, in the myth of humanity's separation from nature, is an accomplishment of the cheap food regime: "by linking and integrating the products [and relations] of so many ecosystems and communities, [it] obscured the very connections it helped create." 55
The new synthesis, specific to the era of large-scale industry and its heirs, was agroindustrialization, or simply "industrial agriculture"-in both its symbolic and material forms. 56 The first of two great phases of agroindustrialization begins in the decades before the Civil War, not only feeding England but propelling American industrialization-beyond textiles, and in the capital-goods sector-after
57
And yet, agroindustrialization was more than a technical affair. It was, pivotally, about deploying power, capital, and science to appropriate the wealth of the continent. The extraordinary accomplishment of American capitalist agriculture in the nineteenth century is found in its harnessing of continental space as central to rising labor productivity. Here was an agricultural revolution with few gains in land productivity: yields per hectare were the same for maize and wheat in 1930 as they were in 1870. 58 Labor productivity, however, surged, especially for cereal crops. Labor time in maize cultivation fell by nearly two-thirds in preharvest work and by one-half in harvesting between 1840 and 1900, 59 and continued to fall over the next three decades. 60 Off-farm revolutions in transport magnified productivity gains yet further. 61
Although "biological innovation" and mechanization were responsible for a considerable measure of this advance, the decisive variable was the blood and dirt of the frontier. On the one hand, this frontier was made possible by an extraordinary mix of violence and spatial rationalization-not only clearing the land of troublesome natives, but imposing a spatial grid that made the continent legible for capital accumulation, for which modern property relations are quite useful. 62 55. Cronon, Nature's Metropolis, 256-57. 56. Weis, Global Food Economy, and The Ecological Hoofprint (London: Zed, 2013 Hence, the centrality of the American state in making this agricultural revolution possible. On the other hand, the frontier offered up millennia of accumulated nutrients (and water), which sustained the radical advance of the "industrial" agricultural model in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Western
Kansas wheat farmers in the 1870s enjoyed labor productivity that outstripped some European cultivators by an order of magnitude. 63 But within two decades, land productivity began to decline in western Kansas. By the 1920s yields per acre were between one-quarter and one-half of the 1890s peak. 64 Nevertheless, labor productivity continued to rise. 65 But, as the Great Depression made clear, labor productivity would need to advance even faster in the decades to come.
This "first" industrial agriculture was exhausted less for internal than for external reasons. If the first (American) agroindustrial model had consolidated Britain as the workshop of the world, a new agroindustrial model would have to be found for the consolidation of America as the world's assembly line.
This new model would be found in a new configuration of capitalization and appropriation, taking shape in the 1930s with the introduction of hybrid maize and new, higher-yielding, strains of wheat. 66 The Green Revolution's core synthesis brought together the nineteenth century's dynamic family farm model with hybrid maize, the biological pivot of a new property regime. The commercial introduction of hybrid maize in the United States in the mid-1930s promised not only rising yields per acre but also rising capitalization through mechanization and skyrocketing fertilizer (and then pesticide) use. The new maize worked for capital through a paradoxical combination of high-yield seed that produced "lowyield" offspring: the inbreeding of hybridized maize variants produced sharp declines in the second generation. Seed saving gave way to seed shopping. 67 The millennial relation between seed and grain had been severed, replaced with the cash nexus. 68 In this, hybridization joined agroecology and market discipline in a new, higher synthesis: the "petrochemical-hybrid complex." 69 The magic of this Green Revolution was found in an old script with a new twist. The potential of the hybrid revolution was amplified by massive statefunding of university-led agricultural research, with origins in the late nineteenth century, and a new phase of capitalization that included mechanization but went far beyond. The capitalization of agriculture advanced as never before: "labor inputs" fell by more than two-thirds, and mechanization rose 213 percent, between 1935 and 1970. Fertilizer and pesticide inputs increased by an extraordinary upward, to 7.5:1 in the 1950s and to 10:1 by the early 1970s. 75 By the twenty-first century, 15-20 calories were needed to deliver one calorie of food from farm to table, and considerably more than this for globally sourced fresh fruit. 76 Any epoch-making extension of this model today will depend on locating new sources of cheap energy that not only replace declining supply zones but significantly expand those sources. Capitalism is no steady-state system; replacement is insufficient.
The second great transition inaugurated by the long Green Revolution was toxification. For the first time, the leading edge of toxification shifted toward agriculture. The massive increase in pesticide and herbicide production-an order of magnitude increase between 1950 and 1980-has made agriculture a vanguard agent of toxification. 77 For many years, the poster child for this toxification was DDT (dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane). Some 1.3 billion pounds of this pesticide-and powerful carcinogen-were used in the United States following DDT's introduction to agriculture in 1945 until it was banned in 1972. 78 Here my sense is that many of the most significant effects of massive pesticide use-one billion pounds a year in American agriculture-have yet to be fully realized. 79 . Why so little attention to cancer prevention?, asked one NIHfunded study: "The economic reasons loom largest. . . . There are extraordinary profits in the pharmaceutical industry in general, and chemotherapeutic drugs currently in use or on the horizon are some of the most profitable. A Forbes magazine story in 2004 quoted a clinician at a cancer treatment center in New York as saying that ten years earlier, he could extend the life of one of his patients by 11.5 months on average with a drug that cost $500; in 2004, he could extend the life of a patient with the same diagnosis 22.5 months, at a cost of $250,000. The goal of many current cancer treatment protocols is to repeat this experience with more and more types of cancer. Targeted chemotherapy . . . is the Holy Grail of pharmaceutical companies, and the number of people living with cancer in the U.S. is expected to double in the next two decades. These trends are likely to greatly increase profits in this industry. Those who seek to prevent or reduce the magnitude of these profits risk being swept aside by industry representatives and their political and scientific spokespeople" (Richard W. Clapp, Molly M. Jacobs, and Edward L. Green Revolution signifies the erosion of the model's capacity to deliver a rising stream of unpaid work/energy into commodity production. 86 Agrobiotech's promise to restore cheap food has fizzled. Such exhaustion is not novel, of course. We have seen it many times before. The exhaustion of English agriculture in the eighteenth century didn't mean they stopped growing wheat. It did mean, however, that English agriculture no longer sustained cheap food.
What needs to be explained is agrobiotech's nonrevolution: no reversal of yield deceleration, 87 no net gain in food security. 88 "Dispossession" has registered so strikingly in radical discourse precisely because neoliberalism's agrarian transformations redistributed power and wealth from poor to rich without a productivity revolution. 89 World agricultural productivity growth slowed from 3 percent a year in the 1960s to just 1.1 percent in the 1990s. 90 This contradiction-between nature-as-tap and nature-as-sink-is issuing limits of a new sort: the limits of negative value. 93 From the beginning, modernity's Cheap Nature strategy has been premised on a trinity of specific projects:
(1) the deployment of juridical, cartographic, and quantitative procedures to map, secure, and code Nature with a capital "N"; (2) the rationalization of production, as with monocultures and assembly lines, to "simplify" nature within the sphere of production; (3) The accumulation of negative value is a way to think about modernity's limits as coproduced through the accumulation of capital and the production of nature.
93. In this, Foster comes close conceptually-without altering his social reductionist model of capitalism-to the present argument: "The accumulation of capital is at the same time the accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world's people, but living species generally," John Bellamy Foster, "Capitalism and the accumulation of catastrophe," Monthly Review 63, no. 7 (2011) It should be not confused with a broader set of so-called environmental problems arising from nutrient depletion. There are two main reasons for this. First, negative value transcends the boundaries of the human and extrahuman. Second, active negative value intrudes directly into the costs of production and therefore cannot be externalized. Negative value, from this perspective, is bound up with, but not reducible to, the externalization of costs and the social movements-environmentalism above all-that have developed in response to this externalization since the 1970s. Capitalism's double squeeze on taps and sinks has been recognized-especially in relation to climate change 104 -but I think its epochal implications are underappreciated, in at least two major ways. One is that waste production is overflowing the sinks to such a degree that toxification is now spilling over onto the ledgers of capital. Climate change, once again, is our "thickest," most expressive instance of this general law. The connection between biospheric "state shifts" and accumulation crisis is much more intimate than dominant redgreen thinking allows. 105 But I think there is another, deeper, historical-geographical problem that has not (yet) been sufficiently considered in relation this double squeeze. This problem turns on the distinctive temporalities of nature-as-tap and nature-as-102. John U. Nef, The Conquest of the Material World (New York: Meridian, 1964); Georgius Agricola, De Re Metallica, trans. Herbert Clark Hoover and Lou Henry Hoover (1556; New York: Dover, 1950 105. "There is no purely economic reason that capitalism as a system might not continue indefinitely despite its manifest failures and contradictions"; John Bellamy Foster (as "Editors"), "Notes from the Editors," Monthly Review 58, no. 1 (2007) , http://monthlyreview.org/2007/03/01/march-2007-volume -58-number-10, emphasis added. sink. 106 New primary production regimes, until now, could develop much faster than the contradictions of externalizing costs onto the backs and blood of human and extrahuman natures. Outrunning these contradictions was possible because there were geographical frontiers-not just continents, but bodily, subterranean, and atmospheric spaces-from which "free gifts" could be extracted, and "free garbage" deposited.
There is, then, a fantastically nonlinear dynamic at play that has been insufficiently apprehended by students of global environmental change and global political economy. The dynamism of capitalist technological advance not only produces a tendency for industrial production to run ahead of its raw materials supply-Marx's "general law" of underproduction 107 -it also produces a "general law" of overpollution: the tendency to enclose and fill up waste frontiers faster than it can locate new ones. Thus a graph of the waste accumulation curve over the longue dure´e would show a nonlinear slope with a series of sharp upticks after 1945, 1975, and 2008. As "resource quality"-a wretched term-declines, it is not only more costly to extract work/energy, it becomes more toxic. This is the transition from placer to cyanide gold mining, or the rising share of strip mining in world coal production. 108 These are the limits that issue from the production of negative value.
These new limits signal the emergence of forms of nature that are increasingly hostile to capital accumulation, and that can be temporarily fixed (if at all) only through increasingly costly, toxic, and dangerous strategies. The rise of negative value-latent for much of capitalist history-therefore suggests a signifi- Two major streams of negative value can be identified immediately. (These are far from the only ones, and we focus on the explicitly biospheric and biological moments as particularly expressive of the problem, not as the boundaries of the process. 112 ) One is climate change. Together, world agriculture and forestry (including land clearance) contributes between one-quarter and one-third of greenhouse gas emissions-rivaling or exceeding industry or energy. 113 On 111. Moore, Capitalocene, Part II," and Web of Life. On the one hand, capitalism internalizeshowever partially-the relations of the biosphere. In the process, the agencies of capital and empire (but not only these) seek to turn the work/energy of the biosphere into capital (abstract social labor). On the other hand, capital's internalization of biospheric process-which is something that all human organizations do-simultaneously shape the biosphere's internalization of capitalism's process. These are asymmetrical relations, of course, whose valences and vectors change over time. In this, the philosophical point shapes the historical observation: capitalism, like all civilizations, is constituted through a double internalization: capitalism-in-nature/nature-in-capitalism. To say human activity of any sort "organizes" nature is to say that human activity is ontologically coincident with, and constituted through, specifically bundled relations with the rest of nature. "Society" is not only a producer of changes in the web of life but also a product of it; this is the heart of a coevolutionary method in which human history is always bundled with the rest of nature (see Moore, Web of Life).
112. A fuller analysis of negative value would move beyond the immediately geobiological emphasis that I have presented, and unpack, for instance, the role of financialization in food commodity markets and in shaping global supply chains, from grain trading to supermarkets, which have the consequence of squeezing both producers and customers in the "corporate food regime." See, respectively, Kaufman, Bet the Farm; S. Ryan Isakson, "Food and Finance: The Financial Transformation of Agro-food Supply Chains," Journal of Peasant Studies 41, no. 5 (2014): 749-75; Philip McMichael, "The Land Grab and Corporate Food Regime Restructuring," Journal of Peasant Studies 39, nos. 3-4 (2012) : 681-701. The financialization of agrofood relations (including the recent "land grab"), moreover, signals a new stage in the fetishization of food at the very moment when the relations of power and production in the global food system have become more transparent than ever before (see esp. Jennifer Clapp, "Financialization, Distance and Global Food Politics," Journal of Peasant Studies 41, no. 5 [2014]: 797-814). Such a line of investigation would reveal finance and farming as coproducing not only food and capital, but climate, power, and much more. the one hand, climate change is reinforcing tendencies-such as the depletion of aquifers-already in motion before the 1990s. On the other hand, climate change is creating new problems: suppressing the yield of the "big four" cereals (rice, wheat, maize, and soy), changing precipitation patterns, and suppressing labor productivity during the increasingly hot summer months when most planting and harvesting occurs. 114 In some cases, rising CO 2 concentrations may favor certain crops-wheat or rice, for instance. 115 But such productivity gains are strictly hypothetical: they will be offset by rising temperatures over the middle run of 20 years and, over the short-run, the advance of invasive weeds whose geographical range and fertility will nullify potential gains from carbon fertilization. 116 Lobell and his colleagues find that between 1980 and 2008 "global maize and wheat production declined by 3.8% and 5.5%, respectively, compared to a counterfactual without climate trends." 117 By 2035, agriculture will bear one-third, and by 2060 two-thirds, of the global economic "damages" issuing from climate change-in what is surely a conservative estimate offered by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 118 Here is the accumulation of negative value at work: the production of direct barriers to the accumulation of capital as a whole, mediated through the climate-mediated erosion of agricultural productivity.
While no simple causal line can be drawn between climate change and particular weather events, the link between global warming, drought frequency, and global aridity is well established. 119 One therefore reads with some concern about American maize production moving toward more-not less-drought sensitivity. 120 It may be useful to underscore that the American Midwest is responsible for one-third of world maize output and half of world exports. 121 Any serious drought in America's agricultural heartlands is therefore something of a worldhistorical event. California's recent history is illuminating in this regard. By January 2014, "nearly all of California," the country's leading agricultural state, "was in a state of extreme drought," and half of the United States suffered from drought by May, affecting "54% of the national wheat crop, 30% of the national corn area, 22% of soya beans, 32% of hay crops and 48% of cattle." 122 By the end of 2014, we learned that California's drought was the "most severe . . . in the last 1200 years." 123 While drought is not exceptional in itself, the global trend since 2001 has been toward "longer, more severe droughts," a movement with dire implications for yields 124 -and for rising costs of production. A second stream of negative-value accumulation is more subtle but just as problematic. This is the "superweed effect": the tendency of extrahuman natures to evolve more rapidly than the technological disciplines of capitalist agriculture. 127
In essence, the superweed effect signifies the coevolution of forms of work/energy that are hostile to capital accumulation and whose hostility cannot be read- 127. Moore, "Cheap Food." 128. "As control is gained within a limited sphere, the broader conditions for predictability (e.g., in agriculture) are undermined," thence renewing the cycle: with expanding quantitative and evolving quantitative dimensions" (Victor Wallis, "Species Questions," Organization and Environment 13, no. 4 [2000] : 500-507, 504). 129. Natasha Gilbert, "A Hard Look at GM Crops," Nature 497 (2013) Roundup Ready (glyphosate-resistant) crops, only this time the herbicides in question are much more toxic." 131 Nor is this concern merely speculative. Already, 2,4-D applications in the United States have grown apace with glyphosate (e.g., Roundup
Ready) use-the former rising 90 percent between 2000 and 2012. 132 Nor is the superweed effect limited to weeds. Antibiotic resistance, fueled by the meat-industrial complex and abetted by the Western medical model, has developed to such an extent that it threatens "to set medicine back a century." 133 For the World Health Organization, antibiotic (properly, antimicrobial) resistance is an "impending public health crisis" 134 -although one wonders just how impending it really is. As with superweeds, "superbugs" have flourished in an era of warming climate, reinforcing the contradictions of antibiotic promiscuity. 135 The superweed effect's creativity is matched by a less obvious, but portentous, movement of destruction. In this our honeybees and the mysterious "colonycollapse disorder" is instructive. A herald of our times, nobody really understands colony collapse-it is an unpredictable, unruly, unknown vector of a crisis that everybody sees but no one (not yet, anyway) really understands. 139 While some species, like our superweeds, adapt by evolving quickly in the face of new pesticides, for others, the immediate options are much more constrained. Collapse is as much a revolt against capitalist imperatives as surviving the toxic onslaught.
If the proximate cause of colony-collapse disorder is not yet clear, its socioecological roots are not hard to pinpoint. As Kosek explains, capitalist beekeeping has radically altered the structure and behavior of the hive, from logs and skips to a fully industrialized hive modeled on the modern factory. The bee's range has also been radically altered, from a radius of two miles to the migratory geography of the modern bee, who travels thousands of miles of on the back of semi-trucks and is fed on corn syrup and soy protein supplements in order to pollinate single crops for eight weeks at a time. . . . But probably the most important change for contemporary beekeeping was the unprecedented portability and management of the hive in ways that had not previously been possible. This mobility in turn allowed for the rise of the industrial geography of beekeeping, in which 80 percent of the hives in the US are now trucked around the country, serving the mono-crop blooms of large scale industrial agriculture. Without this service, a large portion of contemporary agriculture would simply not be biologically or economically possible. . . . In turn, modern industrial agriculture has been enabled by and transformed the honeybee: they work 2-4 more months than they use to, they are nomadic, they are treated by more chemicals for more dis- 138. Laura Reynolds and Danielle Nierenberg, "Disease and Drought Curb Meat Production and Consumption," in Vital Signs, vol. 20, ed. Worldwatch Institute (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2014) , 49-52, quote at 51; see, e.g., Mike Davis, The Monster at Our Door: The Global Threat of Avian Flu (London: Verso, 2005).
139. Rowan Jacobsen, Fruitless Fall: The Collapse of the Honey Bee and the Coming Agricultural Crisis (New York: Bloomsbury, 2010). eases and given large quantities of supplemental high fructose corn syrup and cheap soy protein to boost their pollen production. 140 Today, industrialized honeybee production is approaching a tipping point. Bee colony loss rates increased from an average of 10-15 percent in the second half of the twentieth century to 20-30 percent (often on the high end) since 2006. 141 This is no small matter. given that we rely, directly and indirectly, on animal (especially bee) pollination for one-third of the food we eat. 142 Some $19 billion in American, and $200 billion in world, agricultural output depends on this pollination. 143 Although pollination costs are a small part of farm costs, the trend is not encouraging: hive costs have tripled-and labor productivity falteredover the past decade. 144 Nor is the recent experience of southwest China encouraging-where hand-pollination is common and "where wild bees have been eradicated by excessive pesticide use and habitat" removal. 145 Among the culprits is the deployment of neonicotinoid insecticides, introduced in the mid-1990s. And while the evidence indicting neonicotinoids for colony-collapse disorder is mounting, 146 it seems clear that the problem is ani-mated by the logic of capitalist beekeeping over the past century, one immanent in the agricultural revolution model that is now faltering. In the heartland of the long Green Revolution, the American Midwest, some 45 percent of bee species have been wiped out 147 -a story sadly replicated across the globe's toxic landscapes of cash-crop cultivation. 148
For colony-collapse disorder, read canary in a coal mine. The basic contradiction is this: capitalist agriculture demands more and more energy to produce more and more calories with less and less labor power. This model has worked by combining technological and organizational advances with the appropriation of cheap soil, water, energy, and even labor. Industrial agriculture appears to be "intensive" but is in fact extensive. Like the capitalist factory, The thesis I wish to explore in this final section is the relationship between the breakdown of capitalism's technological model and the rise of a new ontological politics that challenges not just the terms of productivism but its very logic. For some readers, the notion of technological breakdown will sound counterintuitive, even absurd. Do we not live in a world of unprecedented technological advance? In some ways, yes. Information flows faster, and to a greater number of people, than ever before. But for forty years, labor productivity growth has moved slowly, incrementally. High tech did not change that. The robot factories did not come. A long stagnation now lies ahead. 151 Even this would not be such an immediate problem were it not for the rise of negative value, which threatens to turn slow growth into contraction. The genius of capitalism, through its manifold Cheap Nature strategies, was to outrun the rising costs of production by locating, creating, mapping, and quantifying natures external to capitalism but within reach of its power. Today, there is nowhere to run. Capitalism's survival turns on doing more than shifting the rising costs of climate change, energy production, and agriculture onto the account books of other capitalists: it turns on reducing costs for capital as a whole. 152. Although some capitalists always benefit more than others, the point is crucial for it is often unappreciated today: the fact that some capitalists can turn handsome profits from, say, food speculation-as in the case of Goldman Sachs in recent years (Kaufman, Bet the Farm)-rising food prices do not benefit capital as a whole (Moore, "Cheap Food"). ment depended on the cheap energy it made possible. In turn, it radically extended capital's reach into the bounty of nature. The origins of the steam engine have everything to do with capitalism's drive to appropriate the unpaid work/energy of coal, the product of millions of years of earth-system work, and transform it into capital. Marx speaks of the capitalist labor process as one of turning "blood into capital." 153 Is this not also the same for coal, for forests, for the soil and water of farming? And we can go still further. As Marx reminds us in his discussion of the working day, it is not just soil but also human nature that is "robbed" in the normal processes of capital accumulation. 154 The exhaustion of the soil and the worker is immanent to the accumulation of capital.
Consequently, the accumulation of capital-and its technological apparatus-can only fix its recurrent crises through the appropriation of new frontiers of uncapitalized nature. The last frontiers that remain are now smaller than ever before, while capital's need for cheap natures is greater than ever before.
We can see this clearly in the nonappearance of a new agricultural revolution. 155 Nearly three decades after the first signs of agricultural stagnation revealed themselves, 156 there is little to suggest a new agricultural revolution in the making. The "second" industrial agriculture born of petrofarming and hybridization has yet to yield a third. There is a "yield plateau" for world agriculture today that appears, with mounting evidence, to be cumulative and not cyclical; it does not appear that this yield plateau can be transcended within the capitalist agricultural model. Even the rosy estimates of the Food and Agricultural Organization anticipate a one-third decline in the rate of output growthfrom 1.5 to 1 percent annually-over the next decade. 157
Agricultural biotechnology, as we know, has sought to extend that model. It has failed, at best providing short-run gains to farmers, who quickly see those gains disappear, leaving them increasingly heavy debt burdens and forced to use more herbicides and pesticides. 158 Very high agricultural productivity may, how-ever, be possible with alternative farming practices premised on agroecology, permaculture, and other noncapitalist agronomies. The spectacular, if episodic, success of the System of Rice Intensification-capable of producing more than 20 tons of rice on a hectare of land-is highly suggestive of such an alternate path. 159 CLASS POLITICS AND THE NEW ONTOLOGY OF FOOD, NATURE,
AND VALUE
Such an alternative path can, of course, only be followed through class strugglebut a class struggle understood as a struggle over the configuration of the oikeios, that thorny, limiting, and liberating relation of life making on planet Earth. This is class struggle as the relation of production and reproduction, of power and wealth in the web of life. 160 In this respect, the barriers to a new agricultural revolution are not limited to biophysical natures as such; they are coproduced through the class struggle, which is itself coproduced through nature.
It is much easier to celebrate the class struggle than to analyze it. We can say with some confidence that food-not just land-has become a central site of the world class struggle in a way that is entirely unprecedented, and that was unthinkable even three decades ago. To be sure, the struggle over food is more than a class struggle, and many forms of food justice appear quite modest: calls for supporting organic agriculture, local farmer's markets, Transition Towns, and so forth. But if neoliberal subjectivities persist-sometimes subtly and at others rudely embracing individualizing and market-dynamics-we are witnessing an important shift since the mid-2000s. This is the movement, unevenly cultural and political, toward "food justice": the popular face of food sovereignty in the Global North. 161 As neoliberalism's macabre redefinition of has food rolled out-shifting from the Green Revolution's caloric metric to the "edible foodlike substances" that now line our supermarket shelves 162 -it seems to have made food, and by extension nature, much more fundamental to the Old Left questions of liberte´, e´galite, fraternite´than ever before. The class struggle of the twenty-first century will turn, in no small measure, over how one answers the questions:
What is food? What is nature? What is valuable?
Even on the basis of its strongest historical justification-the forces of production-capitalism now stumbles. For the alternative suggested by the System of Rice Intensification-taken in both literal and metaphorical senses of the concept-cannot be generalized except through a new imagining of food, nature, and value. It is in this sense that the agroecological alternative is a path that leads, necessarily, out of capitalism and toward a socialist world-ecology. 163 This alternative can only be realized-can only be organized in the present-through a class struggle that redefines what is valuable (and what is not) in the civilization we wish to build. 164 
TOWARD A SOCIALIST WORLD-ECOLOGY?
What would a socialist valuation of humans and the rest of nature look like?
This can only be answered through practical activity and reflexive theorization.
But provisional answers, taken as guiding threads, 165 can be offered.
In my view, the elements of a socialist world-ecology are all around us. And though these elements are not limited to food, food politics today offers some of the most hopeful glimpses of the future many of us wish to see. In the United States, organic, urban, community-assisted and guerrilla agriculture are still small parts of the picture, but effective ones-a revolt against what transnational corporate food and capitalism generally produce. This revolt is taking place in the vast open space of Detroit, in the inner-city farms of West Oakland, in the victory gardens and public-housing of Alemany Farm in San Francisco, in Growing Power in Milwaukee and many other places around the country. These are blows against alienation, poor health, hunger and other woes fought with shovels and seeds, not guns. At its best, tending one's garden leads to tending one's community and policy, and ultimately becomes a way of entering the public sphere rather than withdrawing from it. 166 Even allowing for some measure of exaggeration in this statement-it is clear, for instance, that state power will be needed, in the United States and elsewhere, to reorient agriculture toward democratic and sustainable practices 167 -food and agriculture has become a decisive battleground of the world class struggle. It is no longer largely a struggle of peasant against landlords. Food security, safety, and sustainability have become central questions in the everyday lives of the world proletariat, from Beijing to Boston. 168 Such developments in the North are still modest in world perspective. In this respect, the rise of Vía Campesina signals an important development in the world history of food. 169 Vía Campesina, representing some 200 million people, challenges the very heart of capitalist productivism in agriculture through its articulation of food sovereignty. Food sovereignty, at its best, asserts a revolutionary ontology of food-food as biospheric, as democratic, as cultural . . . all at the same time. 170 Each moment is implied in the others, "sustainability" unthinkable except through democratic and egalitarian praxis. In this vision, food sovereignty becomes the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts the aspirations and needs of those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations. It defends the interests and inclusion of the next generation. It offers a strategy to resist and dismantle the current corporate trade and food regime, and directions for food, farming, pastoral and fisheries systems determined by local producers and users. Food sovereignty prioritizes local and national economies and markets and empowers peasant and family farmer-driven agriculture, artisanal fishing, pastoralist-led grazing, and food production, distribution and consumption based on environmental, social and economic sustainability. Food sovereignty promotes transparent trade that guarantees just incomes to all peoples as well as the rights of consumers to control their food and nutrition. It ensures that the rights to use and manage lands, territories, waters, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of us who produce food. Food sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality between men and women, peoples, racial groups, social and economic classes and generations. 171
But if class struggle is always present, it frequently takes "structural" forms. Capitalism's agricultural revolution model is about class; it is about capital; and it is about a capitalist project to make nature external, controllable, and cheap. Power, capital, and nature form an organic whole, not just in capitalist agriculture but for capitalism as a system-as a world-ecology. From this standpoint, the possibilities for a new capitalist agricultural revolution are deeply constrained by the intensification of the practices and contradictions at the core of the long Green Revolution, now powerfully reinforced by climate change.
Capitalist agriculture today is headed toward-perhaps it is already in the midst of-an epochal transition. Where once capitalist agriculture contributed to capital accumulation by reducing the costs of labor power, it now threatens to increase those costs. In so doing, it undermines even the middle-run conditions for renewed capital accumulation. In this sense, we are living through the "last" food crisis: not because food insecurity will disappear, but because the food price spike that began in 2003-6 is an epochal, not developmental, turning point. This is signaled by the rise of negative value: socioecological shifts within the web of life that directly constitute barriers to endless accumulation. At the point of production, the superweed effect shows our future in the present: more energyand chemical-intensive strategies to discipline agroecologies as these evolve into forms of work/energy hostile to commodification. At the scale of the biosphere, the energy-intensive character of capitalist agriculture now feeds the spiral of global warming that increasingly limits capitalist agriculture itself.
Global warming poses a fundamental threat not only to humanity, but also, more immediately and more directly, to capitalism itself. This inverts the usual line of radical critique, which overstates the resilience of capitalism in the face of these changes-an overstatement that derives from a view of capitalism as a social system that acts upon nature, rather than a world-ecology that develops through the web of life. But the condition for maintaining negative value in its latent state was the possibility for moving entropy out of commodity production. Today, such latent negative value can no longer be moved out of commodity production. Planetary contradictions-from the biosphere (climate) to the body (disease)-are now penetrating global re/production relations with unusual power and salience. Global warming will, over the next two decades, so thoroughly mobilize heretofore latent negative value-fed by capitalist agriculture and in turn undermining the Cheap Food model-that it is difficult to see how the capitalist agricultural model can survive. This is not only because of its internal contradictions (within the circuit of capital) but also because of the new ontological challenge to capitalism's valuation project itself (within capitalist civilization). Negative value is destabilizing surplus value, and in doing so it is making possible new, emancipatory and egalitarian vistas. Negative value, as it congeals from here forward, is a barrier to capital as such; its encouragement of a new ontological politics carries forth the possibility of alternative valuations of food, nature, and everything else. It is these alter-42 | CRITICAL HISTORICAL STUDIES SPRING 2015 native valuations that will be absolutely critical in translating today's negative value into alternative ethico-political valuations that can become hegemonic. In revealing capitalism's value relations as the "value of nothing," 172 the new contradictions and new movements bring into question the value of everything. The end of cheap food may well be the end of modernity, and the start of something much better.
172. Patel, Value.
